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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Russia's multipolar landscape 
Vladimir Putin’s decision not to leave the political stage upon completion of his 
second presidential term produced a pseudo-multipolar diorama in Russian 
politics.  The diarchical leadership structure occasionally appears strained, but 
President Medvedev’s forays (thus far, primarily rhetorical) into reform of the 
judiciary or of corrupt practices among the apparatchiki seem simply to imply 
critique of the still unassailable Prime Minister Putin; thus far, few moves suggest 
the president intends to pose a serious challenge to his prime minister, only, 
perhaps to individual members of the surrounding siloviki clan. 
 
However, a new dimension recently appears to have been added to the scene, 
as the new head of the Orthodox church in Moscow, Patriarch Kirill, has stepped 
into the political realm, specifically in matters involving the passage of legislation.  
After a meeting with deputies from United Russia, Patriarch Kirill apparently was 
granted the right to preview all legislation under consideration by Russia’s Duma.  
The Patriarch had appealed to leaders of the Duma’s central party, United 
Russia, regarding legislation that formed part of an EU-sponsored initiative to 
bring sex education into schools. (1)  More recently, the Patriarch’s trip to 
Ukraine, despite strenuous denials from church leadership of political 
implications, has raised concerns that Kirill’s pastoral “pilgrimage”  indeed has 
decidedly political overtones: “[Kirill] sees himself as the patriarch of Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and all the Orthodox Christians throughout the 
world….” (2)  
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The potential addition of Patriarch Kirill to Russia’s political firmament seems to 
produce a neo-tsarist spin on Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality.  In this 
modern, deconstructed version, Patriarch Kirill clearly personifies Orthodoxy; 
absolute power resides in the person of Vladimir Putin, whatever his formal 
political position; and President Medvedev wades into the contentious arenas  of 
national pride and historical revision with the creation of his commission to review 
possible misrepresentations of Russian/Soviet history.  (This Commission, 
headed by apparatchik-extraordinaire, Sergei Naryshkin, seems particular 
concerned with the efforts of former Soviet republics and satellites to write their 
own versions of events during WWII and evaluate for themselves their 
experiences with liberation/subjugation at the hands of Soviet forces.) (3) 
This new expression of the formula embraced by Tsar Nikolas I may exude an air 
of familiarity, but it lacks a key component:  the three elements of this ideology 
once were personified in a single individual.  Perhaps, if the new model 
discomfits, Putin someday will be persuaded to re-consider the tri-polar power 
structure and stand once again for election to the presidency on a platform of 
strong nationalist planks with his commitment to Orthodoxy given Patriarch Kirill’s 
imprimatur. 
 
Despite its domestic uses, the multipolarity concept’s initial application belonged 
to the realm of international relations, and here, too, it is strangely resonant now.  
This month brought high-level visits to the region by both the new US President 
and Vice President.  Barack Obama’s Moscow trip featured meetings with both 
President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin.  The public exhibition carried forth 
the tone of an old school arms control Summit; fortunately, despite the build up 
given to its hallmark arms agreement, none of the urgency or gravity of the 
earlier Cold War era was in evidence.  
 
Vice President Biden called in on the leaders of Ukraine and Georgia this month 
as well, in visits that seemed intent on expressing solidarity through presence 
alone.  In Tbilisi and Kyiv, his words conveyed little in new policy relevance, but 
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reflected general support.  (In Georgia, Biden did make known US policy on 
providing even defensive weapons to Georgia.  Please see The Caucasus 
Region, below.)  For the leaders of Ukraine and Georgia, Biden’s visit itself, with 
its acknowledgement of US interest, was the message. 
 
As the focus of US foreign policy, and the Obama administration’s developing 
vision internationally, shifts ever more perceptibly towards the Middle East and 
the Iranian question, Russia is posed with a question that jumps from the pages 
of its own multipolar playbook:  What leadership role is Russia willing to play as 
the world considers a new security concept for the Middle East that factors in the 
potential (a potential made possible by Russian expertise and materiel) for a 
nuclear-armed Iran? 
 
The approach being put forward by the Obama administration appears to mark a 
departure from previous efforts to prevent Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon 
and may instead have moved focus to deterrence of a nuclear-armed Iran.  
Certainly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent remarks in Thailand 
pointedly suggested that Iran should consider the ramifications of a possible US  
“defense umbrella over the region” and whether or not “Iran will be any stronger 
or safer, because they won’t be able to intimidate and dominate, as they 
apparently believe they can, once they have a nuclear weapon.” (4) 
 
Most relevant to Russia in this debate appears to be the US intention to construct 
a multilateral approach to the issue, signaled most notably this month by a series 
of warnings to Israel by American officials, most recently Pentagon officials in 
advance of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ visit to the region, cautioning 
against an Israeli strike on Iran.  (5)  Earlier such warnings contained a request 
that the new US administration not be surprised by a serious shift in “facts on the 
ground” before it could take up the issue; now, it appears US policy would favor a 
multinational approach in resolving the Iran issue.   
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Russia is thus faced with a critical “multipolar moment.”  After reaping the 
financial benefits of providing the elements of a nuclear energy program (at least) 
to Tehran, what effort is the Russian leadership willing to exert in order to deter 
the weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program, or perhaps to deter a nuclear 
weapon armed Iran?  Previous years have seen what appear to be Russia’s 
willingness to proliferate nuclear technology throughout the region; by some 
estimates, Russia has offered its nuclear services to thirteen Arab states. (6)  Will 
proliferation of its nuclear technology form the cornerstone of Russia’s approach 
in the Middle East?  Or is it possible that having provided Iran the wherewithal to 
establish its nuclear program, Russia’s leaders will take another long, hard look 
at a map, contemplate the question of security along its southern flank, and 
derive a constructively multipolar conclusion? 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Orthodox Church gets a say on Duma Bills,” by Alexandra Odynova, 10 Jul 
09, The Moscow Times via 
www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1010/42/379444.htm.  Last accessed 30 Jul 
09. 
(2) “Will the New Patriarch of Moscow Succeed in His New Role in Ukraine?”  
Comment by Andrei Zolotov, Jr., 27 Jul 09, Russia Profile via 
www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=International&articleid=a1248717160;  
See also commentary from Brian Whitmore, “From a Diarchy to a Troika,” 9 Jul 
09 Power Vertical blog, 
“www.rferl.org/content/From_A_Diarchy_To_A_Troika/1773488.html. 
(3) “Medvedev says no to false history,” 24 May 09, Russia Today via 
www.russiatoday.com/Politics/2009-
0519/Medvedev_says_no_to_false_history.html. 
(4) See, among other sources: “Clinton Speaks of Shielding Mideast From Iran,” 
By Mark Lander and David Sanger, 22 Jul 09, New York Times via 
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/asia/23diplo.html. 
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(5) See, for example, “Israel Attack on Iran Could Hurt US,” By Hillary Leila 
Krieger, 19 Jul 09, JPost.com via 
www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&ci
d=1246443850435. 
(6) “Russia’s Mid-East Role,” by Stephen Blank, Perspective, Vol XVIII, No 3 
(May 2008) via www.bu.edu/iscip/vol18/blank.html. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
FSB adds a weapon to its arsenal – Order 65 
In an action that does nothing to belie accusations that Russia is steadily 
regressing into a totalitarian state, the government had a law passed last 
Tuesday authorizing a task force comprised of members of the police, Russia’s 
Federal Security Service, and six other law enforcement agencies, to intercept 
and examine letters and packages sent via the country’s postal system. The 
passage of Order 65, as the law is commonly known, confirms a decree released 
by the Communications and Press Ministry at the beginning of July. Under the 
law, special camera-equipped “inspection rooms” will be established at every 
post office in the country. (1) Within these rooms, authorities have the right to 
check and if need be, hold, open, and examine the letters and packages of 
people suspected of breaking the law, or even those under suspicion of planning 
to do so. (2) The police and each of seven security agencies also were given 
complete access to the postal service’s national and regional databases, which 
not only include names and addresses, but also a complete postal history. (3) 
Additionally, Order 65 grants the security services access to the same 
information collected by electronic communications service providers. (4) 
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Like its predecessor, the Committee of State Security (KGB), the Federal 
Security Service (FSB) long has been suspected of monitoring all forms of 
communication inside Russia’s borders. To many, Order 65 is a formal 
expression of this pervasive, but unacknowledged, state control. In recent years, 
thanks in part to the government’s encroachment on electronic communication, 
Russian citizens have relied more heavily on traditional mail services, because 
an individual’s right to privacy in letters and packages sent by post was 
guaranteed in 1993 with the ratification of the Russian Constitution. Articles 23 
and 24 of the Constitution establish the idea of a private identity, granting every 
citizen “the right to privacy of correspondence, of telephone conversations, 
postal, telegraph and other messages” and banning “the collection, storage, use 
and dissemination of information about the private life of a person” without prior 
consent. (5) Until recently, mail sent through the postal system could be 
examined only after investigators obtained a court order. 
 
Unfortunately, Order 65 no longer contains this provision. In fact, it conveniently 
fails to outline the standards for or process by which mail will be made available 
to the various monitoring agencies. (6) Without clear standards, such decisions 
inevitably will be left to the security services. This last change has exercised the 
country’s human rights proponents, who claim that Order 65 represents a return 
to Soviet-era KGB tactics designed to detect and smother dissent. Moscow 
Helsinki Group, Russia’s oldest non-governmental organization, (NGO) was one 
of the first to go on record with its view of Order 65 as a violation of the 
constitutionally mandated right to privacy. Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the NGO’s 
leader, called the inspection rooms “a front” that “will allow the security services 
to rifle through private correspondence with impunity.” (7) The liberal press, most 
notably Novyye izvestia, also has joined in the protest, editorializing that Order 
65 is simply another action in a long line of governmental maneuvering designed 
to monitor everything its citizens are doing. (8) Russia’s security services have 
little need to implement Order 65 effectively, as the simple announcement of the 
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plan, and the criticism it garners, likely will strengthen the deterrent effect of the 
law. 
 
Despite an outpouring of criticism, the government has put forth little effort to 
justify the new law. In a brief statement, a spokesman for Russia’s 
Communications and Press Ministry argued that Order 65 was simply an attempt 
to better “regulate cooperation between post offices and special agencies in the 
course of investigative work” and that “the document was approved by the 
Justice Ministry, which means that it corresponds with the Constitution and the 
other laws of the Russian Federation.” (9) He did concede that the government’s 
newfound ability to monitor mail sent by post could limit the rights of Russian 
citizens, but only those of individuals under suspicion. (10) The Ministry has 
maintained that the order does not give investigators greater power, because 
they still would need to obtain a court order to open letters or packages. The 
conditions that would prompt investigators to request opening mail are outlined 
on the agency’s web site. (11) 
 
These statements have done little to assuage the fears of the plan’s detractors, 
not least because the standards as posted online are so vague (suspect has 
committed a crime, suspect is preparing to commit a crime, the suspect’s actions 
could endanger the public, the military, the economic, or environmental security 
of the Russian Federation) (12) that they could be applied to any situation. The 
decision to enact a decree with such wide-ranging potential for abuse may serve 
to provide insight into the Russian government’s self-perceived strength (or 
weakness) domestically. 
 
Two weeks ago Russia’s Ministry of the Interior established a new department 
dedicated to monitoring public attitudes and preventing social unrest. MVD 
representatives will be stationed in every region of the country to monitor and 
analyze “social tension.” (13) For almost a year, there have been sporadic but 
steady outbreaks of protests and other anti-government demonstrations 
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spearheaded by citizens reacting to the effects of economic crisis. Despite slight 
improvements over the past few months, Russia’s recession, coupled with high 
unemployment and high prices, has lowered the public’s confidence in the 
government’s ability to solve economic and social problems. This has led to 
concern over increasing public unrest. (15) The government’s actions over the 
past few months may be seen as preemptive steps to contain social protest. Of 
course, it is also possible that the Kremlin is using the economic crisis, and 
whatever tension it releases, as a convenient excuse to exert further control over 
its citizenry. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Alexandra Odynova, “Law Enforcement Officers Get Powers to Open Mail,” 
The Moscow Times, 17 Jul 09 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1010/42/379583.htm.  Last accessed 26 
Jul 09. 
(2) Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Russian security services to examine personal post,” 
Reuters, 21 Jul 09 via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE56K61M20090721. Last 
accessed 26 Jul 09. 
(3) “KGB successor declares open season on mail,” The Tehran Times, 23 Jul 09 
via http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=199445. Last accessed 
26 Jul 09. 
(4) Yuri Zarakhovich, “Russian Intelligence Granted New Powers over Citizens 
[mail],” Eurasian Daily Monitor, 21 Jul 09 via http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/2297968/posts. Last accessed 26 Jul 09. 
(5) “Letter-openers: Russian rights revocation?” Russia Today, 17 Jul 09 via 
http://www.russiatoday.com/Top_News/2009-07-17/Letter-
openers__Russian_rights_revocation.html?fullstory. Last accessed 26 Jul 09.  
(6) “Russian Intelligence Granted New Powers over Citizens [mail],” Ibid. 
(7) “Russian security services to examine personal post,” Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
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(9) “Law Enforcement Officers Get Powers to Open Mail,” Ibid. 
(10) “Russian security services to examine personal post,” Ibid. 
(11) “The requirements that must be met for investigators to examine postal 
communication.” Ministry of Communication and Press of the Russian 
Federation, 17 Jul 09 via http://minkomsvjaz.ru/news/xPages/entry.8772.html. 
Last accessed 26 Jul 09. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) “Russian security services to examine personal post,” Ibid. 
(14) “Russian Intelligence Granted New Powers over Citizens [mail],” Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services and Armed 
Forces 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Politkovskaya: New trial announced  
On 17th February, the jury in the Politkovskaya case returned a unanimous not-
guilty verdict against four men accused of conspiring in the reporter’s 
assassination. The decision was made almost inevitable by virtue of DNA and 
fingerprint evidence, as well as by the fact that prosecutors failed to present— 
apparently because they had been misplaced—several key pieces of evidence. 
 
On 27th May, prosecutors in Moscow filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. 
Three weeks later, that body announced that it had annulled the verdict, and 
stated that the case would be reexamined with “new jurors,” although no date 
was set at that time. A week ago, Anna Savitskaya, one of the Politkovskaya 
family attorneys, informed reporters that preliminary hearings would begin on 5 
August.  (2) 
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Until now, Politkovskaya’s family and colleagues have reacted to events by 
focusing purely on the fact that they believe the trigger-man and the “person who 
ordered” the hit were still at large, while insisting that the defendants nonetheless 
were involved in her assassination in some capacity. (3) Since the Supreme 
Court’s ruling however, they have become somewhat more outspoken: on June 
26th, Sergei Sokolov, Politkovskaya’s former deputy editor asserted that “the 
authorities came to the conclusion that it looks very improper that nobody ended 
up behind bars.” (4) The Supreme Court’s decision Sokolov added, was clearly a 
“political not a procedural one,” designed simply for public relations purposes. (5) 
 
Sokolov’s opinion likely is the correct one. If that is the case, the defendants 
stand no chance of being exonerated for a second time, making their lawyer’s 
assertion that his clients have nothing to fear as long as prosecutors are able to 
bring in “unbiased,” and “objective” people for the new jury (6), naïve at best. 
Their actual innocence matters not a jot. The reality is that if the state wants a 
conviction, it will set out to get one, where-after the matter will be considered 
closed. 
 
FSB anti-terror exercise as cover? 
During the spring and early summer of this year, Russia took steps in Georgia’s 
separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, designed to consolidate the 
gains made by Russia and its supposedly newly-independent allies in the conflict 
last fall. The most important step was the agreement signed in April between 
President Dmitri Medvedev, and “Presidents” Eduard Kokoity and Sergei 
Bagapsh, that allowed the FSB’s Border Guards to move in with a mandate to 
protect the “state borders” of the splinter regions until such time as they could 
raise their own forces.  The deployment was justified by the claim that Georgia 
was “provoking” Russia, and that the troops in question were ideally suited to 
provide humanitarian aid to local refugees. (7)  
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On 30th June, the FSB announced that it was launching a new anti-terrorist 
operation in Kabarda-Balkaria, a Republic bordering Georgia. According to 
Natalya Borovinskaya, an FSB spokeswoman, the goal of the operation is to find 
“members of illegal armed formations” who may be hiding in a number of villages 
in the region’s Elbrusskiy District. (8) It is not clear how long this operation is due 
to last, but the timing is interesting: A week after the exercise was launched, a 
number of Russian pundits predicted that the upcoming meeting between 
Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev would decide whether Russia 
would attack Georgia again. (9)  
    
If this assumption was correct, it would shed new light on the Border Guards’ 
deployment, as well as on the exercise: even if an attack has not been ordered 
definitively, preparations would be necessary to ensure that a go-order could be 
executed quickly. What better way of moving forces (particularly elite units) 
toward the start line than under the guise of an anti-terror operation? 
 
In brief: FSB in Ukraine 
On June 28th, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Head of the Ukrainian Secret Service 
(SBU) announced that all Russian FSB officers attached to the Black Sea Fleet 
must leave the country by December 13th. (10) Nalyvaichenko noted that the 
SBU would target any officers believed to be conducting intelligence operations 
actively, and insisted that his agency possessed “sufficient strength,” as well as 
the “means,” to enforce the aforementioned deadline. (11) 
 
Is it possible that the Ukrainian government is publicizing the issue with the goal 
of increasing pressure sufficiently for Russia to have to accept Ukraine’s 
request?   If so, this tactic is unlikely to work. What, realistically, could the 
Ukrainian government do, were Russia to refuse to remove its security and 
intelligence officers from Sevastopol and other locations in Ukraine? 
 
Natalia Estemirova betrayed?  
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On 15th July, Natalia Estemirova, a prominent Russian Human Rights activist 
based in Chechnya, was murdered. Snatched by four gunmen as she left her 
apartment building in Grozny, Estemirova was thrown into a getaway car, which 
apparently, “breezed through” several checkpoints in and around the capital 
unchallenged. Once they had crossed into Ingushetia, her abductors stopped 
their car, forced her out, and killed her, firing five shots into her head and chest. 
(12) At the time of her death, Estemirova was working in Grozny for “Memorial” 
(a Russian human rights group), and her task was to record abuses perpetrated 
by Chechnya’s law-enforcement and security agencies. Estemirova had been 
threatened numerous times, most notably by President Ramzan Kadyrov himself 
in May 2008, when she was “summoned” to his office to face a man proudly 
boasting about the amount of blood on his own hands. (13) It is important to note 
that Estemirova’s death has a wider context. She was a friend of both Anna 
Politkovskaya and Stanislav Markelov, two other Kadyrov critics, who have been 
murdered—the latter just five months ago. 
 
Estemirova’s friends and colleagues have been quick to direct blame for her 
murder towards Kadyrov, (14) noting that once Russia lifted its anti-terror regime 
from the Caucasus republic in April and handed full control to its local strongman, 
Estimirova’s workload had increased significantly.  President Kadyrov has denied 
involvement, threatening to sue those who allege it, (15) and promising to launch 
a full and complete investigation into the assassination, just as President 
Medvedev has. (16) 
 
There is little to no chance of discovering who ordered Estemirova’s murder, nor 
of discovering who carried it out, whether it was Russian special units or 
paramilitary units loyal directly to Kadyrov. It is possible, however, that the hit 
was set up at very short notice, in order to silence her on a specific issue: on the 
day of her abduction, she was due to meet with the Head of the Chechen 
Republic Investigations Directorate of the Investigations Committee under the 
Russian Prosecutor’s office – she had set the session in person the day before. 
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(17) It is also possible that the Chechen and Russian authorities have learned 
from the Markelov and Politkovskaya murders: in contrast to a hit in Chechnya, 
an assassination in Moscow must be investigated, even if only for public relations 
purposes. The killers may have waited to carry out the hit on Estemirova for that 
reason—until she returned to Grozny from a sabbatical in Oxford in the fall of 
2008. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russia Annuls Politkovskaya Verdicts: Court,” AFP North European Service, 
25 Jun 09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(2) “Court to Launch Retrial Of Politkovskaya’s Murder Case on 5 August,” ITAR-
TASS, 22 Jul 09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) “International: Politkovskaya Family Urge New Inquiry After Court Orders 
Retrial,” The Guardian International Edition, 26 Jun 09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(4) “3 Russians To Be Retried in 2006 Slaying; High Court Overturns Acquittal on 
Charges Linked to the Death of Investigative Journalist Politkovskaya,” Los 
Angeles Times, 26 Jun 09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(5) “Supreme Court Overturns Acquittals of Men Linked to Murder of Kremlin 
Critic,” The Daily Telegraph, Jun 26 09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) “Retrial Ordered in Killing of Russian Journalist,” Lost Angeles Times, 26 Jun 
09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(7) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 13 (25 Jun 09).  
(8) “Russia: Counterterrorism Operation Begun in Kabarda-Balkaria,” ITAR-
TASS, 30 Jun 09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
9) “Obama-Putin Meeting ‘Will Decide Whether Russia Attacks Georgia,’” 
Yezhedenevnyy zhurnal, 6 Jul 09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) “Intelligence Chief Vows FSB Operatives will Leave Ukraine,” Interfax-AVN 
Online, 29 Jun 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(11) “Ukrainian Security Chief Says Russian Spies Must Leave Black Sea Fleet,” 
Interfax-Ukraine, 28 Jun 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. 
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(12) “A Very Predictable Murder: Last Week Yet Another Russian Human Rights 
Campaigner Was Murdered. But the Investigation Will Probably Lead Nowhere,” 
The Guardian 23 Jul 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(13) Ibid.  
(14) “Chechen Rights Campaigner is Killed,” New York Times, 16 Jul 09 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) “Chechen President Hits Back Over Claims He Ordered Activist’s Murder; 
Kadyrov Plans to Sue Natalya Estemirova’s Human Rights Group,” Christian 
Science Monitor, 18 July09 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(16) “Chechen Rights Campaigner is Killed,” New York Times, 16 Jul 09 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(17) Russian Murdered Rights Activist Was To Meet Top Investigator on Day of 
Death,” RIA-Novosti, 16 Jul 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Nabucco, Act 2: Suppliers wanted, and unwanted  
In 2002, at the close of a meeting of European energy majors, who had gathered 
in Vienna to discuss the creation of an independent natural gas supply corridor to 
provide the EU energy market with an alternative to Russian domination, the 
newly minted consortium decided to christen their project “Nabucco” after an 
opera by Giuseppe Verdi on the theme of liberation from oppression. Thus, from 
its inception, Nabucco was designed to advance energy security in Europe by 
tapping directly into gas-rich regions in Central Asia and the Middle East, without 
relying on transport networks controlled by Russian gas export monopoly 
Gazprom. It is puzzling, then, that the search for gas producers to supply the 
project has pointed back to Russia. Last week, US special envoy for Eurasian 
energy, Richard Morningstar, extended an invitation to Russia to supply gas for 
the European pipeline, and urged other participating countries to accept Russia 
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as a partner in the project. (1) Whatever its intention, the offer is certain to be 
spurned by Moscow, where the Nabucco pipeline is perceived as a menace to 
core Russian interests. 
             
In recent years, Moscow has had the pleasure of watching the rival pipeline plans 
anguish amid financial meltdowns, political quarrels and supply snags, not a few 
of which were Russian-orchestrated. This summer, however, Nabucco suddenly 
seems to have revived, partly as a result of the pipeline consortium’s taking a 
page from its rival’s playbook and hiring a German politician to boost its project. 
Like Gazprom, which welcomed retired German Chancellor Gerhard Schröeder 
onto its board in 2005, the Nabucco consortium recently hired the former German 
foreign minister and Green Party leader, Joschka Fischer, to serve as chief 
negotiator for Nabucco. (2) Fischer used his credentials as an advocate for 
Turkish membership in the EU as an entré into negotiations with Turkey, a crucial 
transit nation in the Nabucco pipeline scheme that had long been demanding, 
among other highly favorable terms, ownership of fifteen percent of total gas 
volumes piped across its territory, even though other transit nations would be 
allowed to keep only five percent. (3) Fischer’s efforts already have shown 
impressive results: early in July Turkey agreed to a compromise by accepting 
higher transit fees in lieu of discounted gas volumes, and on July 13, transit 
countries Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria signed a key accord 
in Ankara, giving the $11 billion project a boost that has put Nabucco back onto 
the EU energy agenda. 
             
The transit accord is a real victory for Nabucco’s backers, but one that puts the 
pipeline back into thorny territory. No concrete supply deals have been signed 
yet to ensure that the pipeline will carry the 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of 
natural gas needed to satisfy about seven percent of Europe’s gas consumption 
by 2014, as its backers had planned. Though a bitter opponent of the project, 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin made a point when he remarked that 
“before putting millions of dollars into a pipeline and burying it in the ground, you 
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have to know where the gas for this pipeline is going to come from.” (4) To some 
degree, the lack of suppliers is a result of strategic poaching by Russia and to 
some degree it is the result of the Nabucco consortium putting the pipeline’s 
end—energy security through diversification—ahead of the means of filling it.  
             
Recognizing the need for a source of natural gas that is free from Russian 
control, a need that grew more apparent after the 2006 and 2009 Russian-
Ukrainian pricing disputes that left EU countries without gas in mid-winter, the 
Nabucco consortium planned a new pipeline route that would offer a wide range 
of supply sources, including the Caspian region, Central Asia, and the Middle 
East. In particular, the consortium has mentioned Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq, 
Turkmenistan, and possibly Iran as sources for gas. (5)  
             
Each of these potential suppliers presents problems, however. Azerbaijan, the 
country that was supposed to supply the main injection of gas, just concluded a 
supply contract to begin selling natural gas from its Shah Deniz II field to 
Russia’s Gazprom in 2010. Although Baku denies that the Azeri-Russian deal will 
limit the volumes available for Nabucco, the terms of any future supply 
arrangement may have been pushed beyond economy by Gazprom’s agreement 
to pay the steep price of $350 per thousand cubic meters for Azeri gas. (6) By 
comparison, the European price currently stands at $250 per thousand cubic 
meters, on average. (7) Clearly, the Nabucco consortium cannot contract for 
Azeri gas at the higher price and expect to turn a profit downstream. 
         
Turkmenistan, another gas-rich potential supplier, has expressed interest in 
selling volumes to Nabucco, particularly after a mysterious pipeline explosion last 
spring brought the country’s gas exports to Russia to a halt.  (8) Though the 
cause of the blast has not been officially determined, it was clear that Russia’s 
Gazprom, which lost over $1 billion in the first quarter of 2009 by buying Turkmen 
gas at $340 per thousand cubic meters (a number set by Gazprom to out-price 
its competitors, among whom is the Nabucco consortium), stood only to gain by 
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the shut off. (9) Though Ashgabat already has signed an agreement with German 
energy major RWE, a Nabucco consortium member, to tap gas fields on the 
Caspian Sea bed, the country remains totally dependant upon Gazprom-
controlled pipelines to transport Turkmen gas to Europe. (10) Ashgabat’s 
isolation may be nearing an end, however, if Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are 
able to reach an agreement on talks begun recently about building a trans-
Caspian pipeline that would open a new route to the west for Turkmenistan’s gas 
exports. (11) 
             
Iraq is the potential source of gas about which the US has shown the most 
enthusiasm. US Senate foreign relations committee member, Richard Lugar, 
suggested that exports of Iraqi gas through Nabucco could give the country the 
resources it needs for reconstruction: “Ideally, in the way of the world, the natural 
gas—and maybe in due course oil supplies—coming out of a united Iraq might 
provide this kind of capital, which would be a miraculous happening and a 
wonderful ending to a very tragic period in their history.” (12) However, Baghdad 
since has clarified that the country does not have any surplus gas for export at 
present, and, although the country is willing to consider future gas sales to 
Nabucco, there is currently no infrastructure in place to link the country’s gas 
fields to the pipeline. Moreover, in the future, talks over exports of Iraq’s 
contested energy resources must produce an agreement that satisfies rivals 
within and without the Kurdish-controlled territory in the north of the country 
where most of Iraq’s known gas fields are located. (13) 
             
Egypt might serve as a supplier to Nabucco, if a planned Arab gas pipeline is 
realized. (14) For the present, the cast of national gas producers is willing to 
consider offers, but unready to make promises. That leaves the Nabucco 
consortium with sizeable gas supply volumes to secure ahead of 2011, when 
construction of the pipeline is slated to start. The press to make the pipeline a 
reality has some members looking to less agreeable sources, such as Iran. 
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Officially, Iran is off-limits, though talks appear to be ongoing, regardless. Ankara 
has stressed openly that Turkey is relying on Iranian cooperation in Nabucco. 
(15) It was in the context of excluding Iran from the project that US special envoy 
Morningstar raised the idea of including Russia in the supply arrangement 
instead. “My understanding of the agreement is that fifty percent of the gas that 
will go into Nabucco is open for competition among any suppliers and Russia is 
certainly free to participate in that way to supply part of that fifty percent,” said 
Morningstar. (16) 
             
Morningstar’s suggestion struck a number of Nabucco consortium members as 
contrary to common sense. Those members criticized the idea for killing the main 
purpose of the whole pipeline project. With Gazprom as a partner, they argue, 
Nabucco will be just another avenue by which Russia can extend its dominance 
over European energy markets. (17) The naysayers are right to be incredulous. 
No one believes that Russia would participate willingly in a pipeline project that 
Prime Minister Putin calls a frontal attack on Russia’s energy strategy. What 
Morningstar hoped to achieve by suggesting otherwise is anyone’s guess. What 
Putin hoped to achieve by insisting that without Iran, Nabucco is lost, is clear 
enough. (18) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “US says Russia can supply gas to Nabucco,” Upstream Online, 13 Jul 09 via 
(http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article183275.ece). 
(2) “Russian Gas: Black Hats and White Hats in a World of Gray,” The New York 
Times, 13 Jul 09 via (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/world/europe/14iht-
politicus.html?scp=6&sq=&st=nyt). 
(3) “Norway’s Statoil May Bypass Turkey, Imperiling Nabucco Pipeline,” 
Bloomberg, 2 Apr 09 via 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aGW4JZfWm1BM&r
efer=home#). 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Biden visit reassures Georgia, for now 
The recent visit of American Vice President Joseph Biden to Tbilisi appears to 
have been a relative success for Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Biden’s 
trip to Ukraine and Georgia follows closely on the heels of Barack Obama’s trip to 
Moscow to “reset” Russian-American relations. For those concerned that efforts 
at recalibration might come at the expense of Tbilisi, Biden had one message: 
“They have not, they will not, and they cannot.” (1)  
 
Biden’s two day itinerary in the Georgian capital included bilateral talks with 
Saakashvili, an address to the parliament, meetings with non-parliamentary 
opposition leaders, and a visit with displaced children from the August 2008 war. 
 
Although specifics of the top-level discussions have not been released, a senior 
American source stated that Saakashvili requested defensive military weaponry 
from his American visitor and was refused. (2) The issue of provision of materiel 
to Georgia is a controversial one and, not surprisingly, is opposed inflexibly by 
Russian authorities. The Vice President’s trip already had prompted Russian 
 21 
Foreign Minister Gregori Karasin to state in an interview that Moscow would take 
“specific measures” to prevent Georgian weapons acquisition. (3) 
 
Saakashvili apparently also raised the issue of American participation in the EU 
monitoring efforts for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (4) Though Biden made no 
mention of this in his public statements, the EU president recently announced 
that the possible participation of non-EU countries in the mission will be a topic 
for discussion in the fall. (5) The monitoring mission recently was extended for 
another year. 
 
A third likely point of discussion between the two leaders was an admonition by 
Biden that Saakashvili should not attempt to retake the separatist regions by 
force. Indeed, even in his talks to parliament and with refugee schoolchildren, the 
Vice President emphasized the importance of enticing South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia to rejoin Georgia proper by building a strong economy and vibrant 
democracy rather than compelling their return by exercising military power. 
 
Prior to the trip, there had been speculation, particularly in Russia, that part of 
Biden’s purpose was to urge Saakashvili to step down from power. (6) While 
there were hints that the Obama administration wanted to distance itself from the 
over-personalization of Georgian-American relations that characterized the Bush 
era, Biden primarily seems to have encouraged Saakashvili to implement 
reforms, rather than to pave the way for a successor. According to some 
sources, Biden, in his meeting with opposition leaders, emphasized that the 
decision regarding when to hold elections was the purview of the Georgian 
people alone. (7) As the situation stands, Saakashvili’s term does not expire until 
2013, and the opposition has yet to produce a truly capable contender. At this 
point, simply restraining Georgia’s pro-American president from providing a 
pretext for Russian intervention may be viewed by Washington as the best 
contribution to Georgia’s continued independent existence. 
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Biden’s call for continued reforms was not unanticipated. In his address to 
parliament, Biden urged the administration to improve media freedom, ensure an 
independent judiciary, and finesse the division of power between parliament and 
the president. His speech to the legislature came only days after Saakashvili had 
made his own address to the parliament. On that occasion, the Georgian leader’s 
proposals included the direct election of mayors, including in Tbilisi; limitations on 
the power of the president to dissolve parliament; restrictions on the amount of 
contact to be had with judges concerning specific court cases; and an offer to the 
non-parliamentary opposition to reinstate their mandates, which many had given 
up to protest the last parliamentary elections. (8) While Saakashvili’s proposals 
may have been sincere, they also constituted clearly an attempt to preempt 
anticipated criticism from the US Vice President. 
 
Despite calls to improve the domestic situation, Biden’s comments generally 
offered support for issues high on the list of Georgia’s foreign policy objectives. 
For instance, in his speech to the parliament, Biden said that the US would not 
recognize Georgia’s separatist republics and called on Russia to honor the 
agreement brokered by Nicolas Sarkozy after the conflict.  Biden also strongly 
reiterated US support for Georgia’s entry into NATO. 
 
In fact, the Vice President’s statement regarding NATO came at an awkward 
moment, as only days earlier NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
had asserted that Georgia and Ukraine were not ready to join NATO and “the 
situation is unlikely to change in the near future.” (9) Even more problematic was 
a statement regarding Georgia’s NATO aspirations made by Saakashvili in an 
interview with the Wall Street Journal: "We all know that the issue is almost dead. 
It's tragic. If they manage to kill NATO [Georgia's hopes of joining the alliance], it 
means the Russians fought for the right reasons. It would mean you can still 
achieve political goals with brutal sinister means and that [Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir] Putin was proved right.”(10) While Saakashvili’s statement was 
a fairly accurate assessment of the situation, it met with considerable domestic 
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criticism and prompted some presidential backpedaling. The topic is particularly 
sensitive because, for many in Georgia, NATO membership remains an 
important goal. Saakashvili afterwards claimed the newspaper had misquoted 
him and had offered him an apology, but no evidence to support that claim 
appeared in the publication itself. (11) 
 
The Biden visit may not have produced the results that Saakashvili deserved in 
the form of weapons or a promise of US involvement in the EU monitoring 
mission. However, it did leave Saakashvili in a relatively secure position. For 
now, his domestic opposition has called a halt to its strategy of permanent 
protest, (12) and he has received a demonstration of continued US support for 
Georgia despite the Russian “reset.” The extent to which that support will be 
extended once tested by issues requiring Russian participation, such as 
international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear aspirations, remains unclear. 
 
Source Notes: 
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To-The-Georgian-Parliament/. 
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TASS, 23 Jul 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Kyrgyz elections produce new comeback kid 
Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s July 23 presidential elections held few surprises: prior to 
the elections, various obstacles were placed in the way of the few candidates 
plucky enough to challenge Bakiev’s reelection bid; the opposition parties 
struggled to maintain unity and obtain sufficient publicity for their leading 
candidate’s platform; during the election itself, there were numerous and blatant 
attempts at voter fraud, including ballot-box stuffing; and the incumbent, 
Kurmanbek Bakiev, sailed smoothly into a second term.  The post-election period 
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so far also is proceeding in fairly predictable fashion, as President Bakiev takes 
further steps to squash the opposition. 
 
However, the election campaign did have one unexpected result: the 
rehabilitation of former pariah (at least in some circles) Nurlan Motuev, previously 
known as the “Coal King of Kara-Keche.”  Not long after Askar Akaev’s removal 
from power in 2005, Mr. Motuev and an armed group of his supporters took over 
the operation of the Kara-Keche coal mines (located in Naryn Province) and then 
proceeded to sell the coal to the highest bidder, neglecting to pay any taxes on 
the profits. (1)  Quite understandably, these actions put Mr. Motuev in direct 
conflict with the post-Tulip Revolution Bakiev-Kulov governing tandem.  When, in 
January 2006, Motuev and roughly 350 of his supporters threatened to burn 
down the Jumgal District police headquarters in Naryn unless he received 
assurances that he would not be arrested, (2) not only the government, but also 
the Interior Ministry was made to look foolish, and even worse, powerless.  
Motuev finally was arrested on May 23, 2006 and charged with fourteen 
violations of the country’s criminal code, including causing over 37 million som 
(approximately US$1 million) in damages to the mine owners. (3)  Then, in what 
would seem to be a most unlikely turn of events, in April 2009, the Interior 
Ministry’s Main Investigation Department announced that the criminal case 
against Mr. Motuev was being dismissed, due to insufficient evidence, (4) 
clearing the way for him to register as a candidate for the presidential elections. 
 
Motuev had announced early in April his intention to challenge Bakiev in the July 
23 elections, stating that his supporters in the Union of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan 
(which he co-chairs), as well as those in the Joomart Patriotic Movement (which 
he leads) had persuaded him to throw his hat in the ring. (5)  Apparently, he was 
counting on receiving a great deal of support from voters in southern Kyrgyzstan, 
stating in one interview, “You perfectly remember how many people (70 
thousand!) supported me in Jumgal rayon and Naryn Oblast in general, when I 
had restored the order at Kara-Keche coal strip mine.” (6)  In answer to how he 
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planned to finance his campaign, he stated, with somewhat remarkable candor: 
“There are some sponsors who are ready to support me… There is also a small 
coal business. I think I will handle it.” (7) 
 
Kyrgyzstan’s Central Election Commission (CEC) gave its official blessing to Mr. 
Motuev’s candidacy on June 17, 2009 (8) and his campaign was up and running.  
Some of the key points of his platform included promises to raise the minimum 
salary and retirement allowance; use the country’s coal, water, and gold 
resources to reinvigorate the economy; and to turn Kyrgyzstan into a popular 
tourist destination.  He also had some very harsh words for the opposition 
candidates and their supporters, “…people can also make mistakes, for instance 
by electing Hitler or Napoleon. I told about real aspects so that you do not make 
a mistake. Vote with your heart and with your mind for the worthiest candidate.” 
(9)  At a press conference just two days before the election, Motuev further 
smeared his opponents, alleging that main opposition candidate Almazbek 
Atambaev had close ties with criminal enterprises, accusing Temir Sariev of 
“tribalism,” and Toktayim Umetalieva of fraud. (10)  Oddly, he had only praise for 
the incumbent president, lauding all that Bakiev had accomplished in four years 
and even going so far as to state, “We are as if allies. We have no any 
disagreements,” as justification for why he refused to participate in an election 
debate with the president.  He also told journalists that he did not wish to distract 
the president from state affairs. (11) 
 
Given his own run-ins with the law, Mr. Motuev’s use of a smear campaign was 
certainly an interesting strategy. It does not seem to have produced many 
dividends, at least in terms of the election – Almazbek Atambaev beat him out 
rather handily.  However, given Motuev’s history and rumored ties to the late 
Ryspek Akmatbaev’s crime syndicate (to which Bakiev allegedly was connected), 
garnering votes may not have been the main purpose of his campaign.  
Permitting Motuev to register as a candidate may have been the incumbent 
president’s way of offering him a chance to redeem himself, by boosting Bakiev’s 
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campaign.  Rather than stooping to mudslinging himself, the president employed 
Motuev to do it, with the pay-off being Motuev’s complete and very public 
rehabilitation, which will allow him to serve in elected and/or public office in the 
future.  If Motuev comports himself appropriately, he could reap a variety of 
rewards. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Finally, will there be justice for Gongadze?  
On 28 July, Ukraine law enforcement officials announced the discovery of what 
they believe to be skull fragments from murdered journalist Georgy Gongadze.  
The reported discovery comes almost nine years after Gongadze’s decapitated 
remains were discovered along the road in a village outside Kyiv.  The discovery 
also came less than two weeks after the capture of former Interior Ministry 
General Oleksiy Pukach, the man long accused both of overseeing Gongadze’s 
kidnapping and of physically strangling the journalist in 2000. 
 
Pukach first was arrested on obstruction of justice charges in 2003, but was 
released on a pledge to remain in the city.  He quickly disappeared.  Despite 
suggestions that Pukach was hiding abroad—in particular, in Israel—it now 
appears that, for most of his years as a fugitive, Pukach was living comfortably in 
Ukraine. (1) Although he was one of Ukraine’s most wanted men, Pukach’s quiet 
life remained undisturbed until mid-July. 
 
How could this happen?  This is a question repeated frequently by those who 
have followed the hapless, nearly nine year investigation into Gongadze’s death.  
 
The investigative journalist disappeared in September of 2000.  Gongadze had 
been saying for months that he believed he was being shadowed by state 
security officials.  He had reason to be concerned.  Although he was not a well-
known journalist in Ukraine, his investigations of possible corruption among high-
level officials—placed on the internet news portal he cofounded—were unusual 
in Ukraine’s heavily censored media environment.  He openly questioned 
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President Leonid Kuchma about corruption on live television.  He named names 
– very inconveniently for some, apparently. 
 
Not long after Gongadze’s body was discovered, Kuchma’s opponents released 
tapes, which they said contained his conversations secretly recorded by a 
bodyguard.  On the tapes, a voice said to be Kuchma’s repeatedly discusses 
Gongadze and urges his Interior Minister to “deal with” him.  Since the release of 
the tapes in December of 2000, they have been authenticated by several 
international firms and agencies, including the FBI, using voice prints of the 
alleged officials on the tapes. Even so, Kuchma maintains he had nothing to do 
with Gongadze’s murder.  He managed to stave off numerous opposition 
attempts to have him removed from office before the end of his term. 
 
The discovery of Gongadze’s body, the release of the tapes, and Kuchma’s 
apparent impunity, triggered a slow build-up of anger at state officials. It was no 
surprise that, when the Orange Revolution began in 2004, many of Gongadze’s 
friends were at the core of the protests.  It also was no surprise that Gongadze’s 
name became synonymous during the protests with the alleged corruption of the 
administration.  Chants of “Justice for Georgy” and “Bandits to Jail” were 
common during those heady days of “revolution.” 
 
Soon after taking office following these protests, President Viktor Yushchenko 
announced that the Gongadze case would be one of his priorities. “I regard the 
investigation of the death of Gongadze as a matter of honor for me and my 
team,” he said. 
 
Within months, Yushchenko revealed that several suspects—all Interior Ministry 
officers—had been detained and would be charged with carrying out the murder. 
But, he said, “The main task now is to get to the most important thing: who 
organized and ordered the murder.” (2) Weeks earlier, Kuchma’s former Interior 
Minister Yuriy Kravchenko was found dead with two gunshot wounds to the head.  
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The death, which inexplicably was ruled a suicide, seemed to close one 
important avenue of investigation.  
 
Nevertheless, almost four years later, after repeated delays, all three Interior 
Ministry officers were found guilty and sentenced to 12-13 years each in prison.  
During their interrogations, each admitted to being complicit in Gongadze’s 
murder, claimed they were following orders, and named Pukach as their leader. 
Still, total justice has not come for Gongadze or for Ukraine.  While these three 
guilty verdicts and the arrest of Pukach are heartening, no one in Kyiv believes 
that any of these men ordered or arranged the murder.  
 
Pukach is said to be cooperating with officials.  He reportedly has confessed to 
his part in the murder and has begun to name others who were involved.  “The 
main thing is he has confirmed his involvement,” Deputy Head of the State 
Security Service Vasyl Hrytsak said.  “He has confirmed the involvement of some 
state servants whom we suspected, as it were, and he is giving testimony which 
is of interest to the investigation.” (3)   
 
It was unclear what level of “state servant” reportedly has been named by 
Pukach, but Ukraine Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko reacted skeptically to 
these statements.  “I very much hope, on the human level,” she said, “that the 
investigation will not lead to the arrest of pawns.  I hope the real organizers of 
Hia’s [Gongadze’s] murder will be convicted.”  (4) 
 
This skepticism appeared justified when a newspaper connected to Ukraine’s 
opposition Party of Regions carried a comment from Pukach’s lawyer.  In it, 
Serhiy Osyka contradicted Hrytsak and claimed that his client did not name any 
others involved.  (5) Three days later, Osyka was informed by the Prosecutor-
General’s Office that Pukach no longer wished to use his services.  (6) 
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It is possible that Osyka spoke out of concern for the welfare of his client.   Upon 
hearing of Pukach’s arrest, journalists and politicians immediately called for extra 
security measures to protect Pukach, given his potentially explosive testimony 
against former and possibly current officials.  Tymoshenko said simply: “I hope 
that Mr. Pukach’s life will be protected until he gives all information and testifies 
in court.”  (7)  
 
It is unknown whether that information includes the names of the individual or 
individuals that ordered the attack on Gongadze.  Pukach likely received his 
direct order from former Interior Minister Kravchenko, who, conveniently, is dead.  
It appears that three others with information about the case also have died in the 
last several years.  But, a journalist from Kyiv’s Fifth Channel told viewers shortly 
after Pukach’s first interrogation that “not all those who had given Pukach the 
direct order are now dead.”  (8) 
 
Gongadze’s widow, Myroslava, went further.  “Kuchma has reason to be afraid,” 
she said following Pukach’s arrest. “The head of his administration, [current 
Speaker of Parliament Volodymyr] Lytvyn, has reason to be afraid. Many ranks 
within the Interior Ministry have reason to be afraid. Because this was a serious, 
great campaign.” (9)  Myroslava Gongadze and her two children received asylum 
in the US, and she now works for the Voice of America Ukrainian Service.   
 
Mrs. Gongadze also suggested that Pukach could provide information about 
much more than just her husband.  “Georgiy’s murder was just one of the crimes 
committed by President Kuchma’s regime,” she said. “And if Pukach really tells 
everything he knows, I think we can expect large revelations.”  (10) 
 
Almost simultaneously, the Prosecutor-General’s Office (PGO) announced that 
Pukach would be charged not only with involvement in Gongadze’s murder, but 
also in the abduction and beating of journalist Oleksiy Podolskiy.  
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In 2007, two Interior Ministry officers were found guilty of Podolsky’s abduction 
and sentenced to four years each in prison.  They claimed they received their 
orders from Pukach.  The men reportedly claimed that Pukach partially strangled 
Podolskiy and forced him to dig his own grave, but did not kill him in the end.  
(11) 
 
In a discussion of this incident allegedly found on the secretly recorded tapes of 
Kuchma, then-Interior Minister Kravchenko reportedly laughs about the issue and 
then assures Kuchma that he “has a group” and “they have begun to silence 
things.” (12) 
 
The PGO also confirmed that they had reopened the case regarding the death of 
popular opposition leader Vyacheslav Chornovil.  The co-founder of Rukh, 
Ukraine’s first independent political movement, Chornovil died in an unexplained 
car crash in 1999.  The death occurred just weeks before he was to begin his 
campaign against Kuchma in that year’s presidential election. 
 
But, even with all of this activity, many wonder whether anything really will be 
resolved in the end.  “To name those who ordered the murder is one thing,” said 
Myroslava Gongadze, “but to gather evidence and charge them is another 
matter.”  (13)  Moreover, Gongadze’s attorney questioned whether the 
investigation can stand up in court.  
 
Valentyna Telychenko expressed concern over Pukach’s lack of a lawyer for 
some of his interrogations and suggested that this could cause his statements to 
be deemed inadmissible. (14)  Telychenko has reason to be cynical; she has 
endured her fair share of intimidation while trying to force the case to be 
investigated on behalf of Myroslava Gongadze. (15) 
 
But the biggest question surrounding Pukach’s arrest remains – why now?  
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The easiest and most cynical response is that Yushchenko would like to tout “his” 
work on this case during his upcoming re-election campaign, which will begin in 
the fall.  After promising in 2004 to find “justice for Giga” by convicting those who 
ordered the murder, almost five years of inactivity in the case is a clear problem 
for the president.  This is particularly true since the lack of activity can be traced 
almost completely to him and his allies.  
 
In 2005, Yushchenko gave the Security Services of Ukraine and the Prosecutor 
General’s Office, both of which are solely under his authority, complete control of 
the Gongadze investigation.  Voters clearly understand this, and lack of progress 
on this case is one reason why Yushchenko’s rating has fallen into single digits.  
This arrest may be the president’s last ditch effort to resurrect his political 
fortunes. 
 
Tymoshenko, who will run against Yushchenko in the upcoming election, has 
used the opportunity to claim that state officials have protected Pukach from 
arrest for years.  Given his comfortable life in a well-populated area, there is 
some logic to that suggestion.  
 
In a 2006 interview with this author, Tymoshenko suggested that Yushchenko 
had made an agreement with “Kuchma … and some of the highest officials in law 
enforcement agencies” during the Orange Revolution, in order to convince the 
then-president to agree to a new election.  She, and many officials in Ukraine, 
suggest that this agreement included a promise not to pursue Kuchma on the 
Gongadze issue.    
 
“In reality, everybody knows who ordered it [Gongadze’s murder],” she said. “I 
know there is enough evidence, more than enough facts, to put those 
responsible into prison,” she added, but “due to this agreement the case is not 
solved.”  (16)  Both Yushchenko and Kuchma vigorously deny that such an 
agreement exists.  
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Tymoshenko, however, now finds herself in an awkward position, as she, 
Yushchenko, and many former champions of the Gongadze cause have chosen 
to remain largely silent about the case in recent years and to form a government 
coalition with Kuchma’s former ally, Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn.  
The speaker has been accused of complicity in the crime by both Gongadze’s 
family and a parliamentary commission investigating the case.  This commission 
found that “the kidnap and murder of Mr Gongadze had been organized by 
former President Kuchma and Mr Kravchenko and that the current speaker of 
Parliament, Mr V. Lytvyn, and a member of parliament, Mr L. Derkach, were 
involved in the crimes.”  (17)  Like Kuchma, both Lytvyn and Derkach vehemently 
deny these accusations.  Lytvyn recently has called for a thorough investigation 
of the crime.  
 
In reality, given Ukraine’s current polarized political atmosphere, and given that 
the same officials who once refused to investigate the case remain in office, it is 
difficult to understand how a thorough investigation can be completed.  But, at 
the very least, Georgy Gongadze’s family finally may be able to bury their son, 
husband and father.  At the very least, they will know that the man directly 
responsible for killing him is now—and probably will be for the rest of his life—in 
a cell.  This may be as much justice they can hope for in the Ukraine of 2009.  
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